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Foreword 
to Mark Van Hoecke (editor) Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for 
What Kind of Discipline?’ Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011 
 
In order to develop a suitable methodology of comparative law one needs a better view on the 
methodology of legal scholarship within domestic legal systems. Also, within the context of 
the current debate on the scientific status of legal scholarship, it has to be figured out what 
kind of discipline legal doctrine is (or should be) and which kind of scientific methodology is 
most appropriate for what kind of legal research. Here, we are faced with diverging traditions 
of legal scholarship (eg UK vs Continental Europe) and diverging underlying theories of 
'legal science' in the course of history: a 'positive moral science' (natural law tradition), a 
discipline aiming at discovering the will of the (historical) legislator (exegetic school), an 
interdisciplinary discipline (law in context), a social science (legal scholarship as an empirical 
discipline), a conceptual structure (Begriffsjurisprudenz), a normative 'imputation discipline', 
clearly distinguishing 'is' and 'ought' (Kelsen), etc. All this could entail questions as to: 
 
In general:  
(a) linking specific approaches and specific methods, on the basis of the various types of 
research and other distinctions mentioned hereafter , 
(b) or scrutinising more deeply one of these approaches or methods, as applied to legal 
research in a domestic or comparative context.  
 
(1) Types of research 
- explanatory (explaining the law, for instance by diverging historical 
backgrounds in comparative research) 
- empirical (identification of the valid law; determining the best legal means 
for reaching a certain goal – the 'best solution' in comparative law) 
- hermeneutic (interpretation, argumentation) 
- exploring (looking for new possibly fruitful paths in legal research) 
- logical (coherence, structuring concepts, rules, principles, etc – eg the use of 
the Hohfeldian analysis of the concept of right in domestic legal doctrine or 
for the purpose of comparing legal systems) 
- instrumental (concept-building) 
- evaluative (testing whether rules work in practice, or whether they are in 
accordance with desirable moral, political, economical aims, or, in 
comparative law, whether a certain harmonisation proposal could work, 
taking into account important other divergences in the legal systems 
concerned).  
 
(2) Use of supporting disciplines 
- legal history  
- legal sociology  
- legal anthropology  
- legal psychology  
- law & biology  
2 
 
- law & economics  
- ...  
 
(3) Levels of comparison 
- conceptual framework of legal doctrine 
- principles 
- rules 
- cases 
- ...  
 
(4) Levels of research 
- description (interpretation) 
- systematisation (theory building) 
- ...  
 
(5) Schemes of intelligibility1  
- causal 
- functional 
- structural 
- hermeneutical 
- actional 
- dialectical 
- ... 
 
(6) Ideological perspectives 
- individualistic v communitarian 
- nationalistic v international 
- positivist v morally, politically oriented 
- monistic (order) v multi-layered (pluralistic, disorder) 
- nature v culture 
- … 
 
Doctrinal legal research ranges between straight forward descriptions of (new) laws, with 
some incidental interpretative comments, on the one hand, and innovative theory building 
(systematisation), on the other. The more 'simple' versions of that research are necessary 
building blocks for the more sophisticated ones. Inevitably, the more descriptive types of 
research will be, by far, more numerous. Comparative law usually remains at the level of 
description, combined with some comparison (but mostly at the 'tourist' level). In attempts of 
(European) harmonisation, however, a clear level of systematisation (theory building) has 
been established. 
 
All scientific research, including legal research, starts from assumptions. Most of them are 
paradigmatic. This means that they are the generally recognised assumptions (‘truths’) of 
legal scholarship within that legal system, or the common assumptions of all the compared 
                                                 
1
 See on this J-M Berthelot, L'intelligence du social (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 62-
85, and, for an application to legal research, see G Samuel, 'Taking Methods Seriously (Part One)' 
(2007) 2 Journal of Comparative Law 94, 105ff.  
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legal systems in comparative research. They constitute the paradigmatic framework, which 
tends not to be debated as such within the discipline itself. Apart from this, researchers may 
also start from assumptions which are less obvious. In those cases, they have to be made 
explicit, but not necessarily justified. In some of these cases, the outcome of the research will 
only be useful to the extent that one accepts its underlying assumptions. Alternatively, a given 
approach may prove to be more fruitful than research, which (partly) starts from other 
assumptions. A typical example is the recognised 'legal sources', which are not a matter of 
discussion within a given legal system (legal scholarship). Sometimes new legal sources (eg 
'unwritten general principles of law') or principles (eg priority of European law over domestic 
law) are accepted as assumptions, as they seem to be more fruitful, eg for keeping law more 
coherent. A study on such assumptions (and their limits) in domestic legal doctrine and/or in 
comparative research is another possible topic for research.  
 
The questions and suggestions above were proposed to a number of scholars when inviting 
them to lecture at a workshop organised, in October 2009, by the Research Group for 
Methodology of Law and Legal Research at Tilburg University. The current book contains the 
revised papers presented at that workshop, together with two papers by members of the 
Tilburg Methodology research group, which are partly a result of the discussions during the 
workshop and a comment on one or more papers presented there. Other members of the 
Tilburg Methodology research group who commented during the Conference have been Jan 
Smits, Bert van Roermund and Koen Van Aeken. 
 
As an introduction to the papers in this book some conclusions of the workshop are to be 
found hereafter. 
 
Legal scholarship is torn between grasping as much as possible the expanding reality of law 
and its context, on the one hand, and reducing this complex whole to manageable proportions, 
on the other. In the latter case, a purely internal analysis of the legal system involved, isolated 
from any societal context, is an option, most notably visible in French legal doctrine2. In such 
an approach, law is largely cut loose from its context, and societal problems are exclusively 
worded as 'legal' problems, that should be 'solved' without taking into account anything that is 
not 'law'. Moreover, law in this view, means only, for instance, French state law, or even 
more narrowly French official private law. 'Legal reality', here, is confined to legislation and 
case law. There seems to be no other relevant reality for lawyers. In this way, an artificial 
world is created, in which (sometimes artificial) problems are worded and solved, without any 
necessary connection to some societal reality. As law aims at ordering society, at influencing 
human behaviour3, such an approach is felt to be largely insufficient by many scholars. More 
specifically, the failure of doctrinal legal research to build, to structure, to interpret and to 
apply the law in such a way that it fulfils its obvious function in society, together with a 
complete lack of any methodology, has led an increasing number of scholars to question its 
scientific status. In his paper, Mathias Siems argues that teaching and a low profile 'legal 
doctrine' may very well be carried out by legal practitioners (as it actually was the case in 
England until about half a century ago). So, ‘a world without law professors’ would indeed be 
possible in practice. 
 
                                                 
2
 See Horatia Muir-Watt's paper on 'The Epistemological Function of “la Doctrine”'. 
3
 See Julie De Coninck’s paper on ‘Behavioural Economics and Legal Research’. 
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As a reaction, many attempts have been made, from the nineteenth century onwards, to 
broaden legal doctrine, or to conceive it differently. Adding a social science dimension4 or a 
comparative dimension5 have proven fruitful. However, the question then becomes one of 
demarcating the borders of legal science: is there still some kind of 'legal doctrine' left, to 
which pockets of social sciences have been added ? Or will legal doctrine have to be merged 
with social sciences ? And, if so, which disciplines should be favoured: just traditional legal 
sociology, or also law & economics and/or legal history and/or legal psychology and/or legal 
anthropology, or even more exotic disciplines such as 'behavioural economics'6 and/or 
'evolutionary analysis in law'7. How would such a broad interdisciplinary discipline look like? 
Which methods should it use? How can we educate competent scholars who will be able to 
carry out such a broad research programme or even parts of it ?  
 
The demarcation of 'legal doctrine' is not only a matter of fields to be covered, it is also, and 
even in the first place, a question of the identity of the discipline. Is it (mainly) descriptive ? 
Or rather hermeneutical ? Or perhaps normative ? Or should it be explanatory ? This question 
is discussed at length in several papers8. The main conclusion to be drawn is that several 
approaches fit with legal doctrine and that all those approaches can be defended to some 
extent, as long as one keeps a pluralist approach. Under the heading of 'legal doctrine' or, if 
one prefers, 'legal science', many types of research may be carried out: descriptive, 
exploratory, explanatory, wording and/or testing hypotheses and/or theories, or just 
supporting legal practice (and, in that sense, it becomes normative). 
 
Each of those types of research will involve its own methods and each research question will 
imply the use of the appropriate method(s) for that kind of research9. Maybe this variety of 
possible approaches and methods explains the confusion in the terminology used. Although 
Jaap Hage ('Truly normative legal science') and Anne Ruth Mackor ('Explanatory non-
normative legal doctrine') use seemingly contradictory titles, they nevertheless appear to 
largely agree in their view on legal doctrine. Roger Brownsword also points to this implicitly, 
when asking himself ‘what am I doing as a legal scholar in contract law?’.  
 
Should we try to implement some ideal type of 'legal science', bearing the risk of being cut 
loose not only from legal practice but from the large majority of legal academics as well ? Or 
should we rather, pragmatically, aim at adjusting legal doctrine’s centuries-old research 
tradition ? In the latter case, legal doctrine could develop as ‘law in context’, while still 
emphasising the internal perspective on law. Elements of social sciences could be used more 
systematically for underpinning doctrinal research, instead of trying to realise the ambition of 
developing an interdisciplinary super-science, which would integrate everything there is to 
know about law. Legal doctrine should use those disciplines, but not try to integrate them. 
Such an integration raises problems of epistemology, of methodology and of research skills. It 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to demarcate a common epistemological 
                                                 
4
 See the papers by Julie De Coninck and by Bart Du Laing. 
5
 See the papers by John Bell, by Jaakko Husa and by Geoffrey Samuel, and Maurice Adams’ 
comments. 
6
 See Julie De Coninck’s paper 
7
 See Bart Du Laing’s paper 
8
 See the papers by Mark Van Hoecke, Jaap Hage, Pauline Westerman, Jan Vranken and Anne Ruth 
Mackor. 
9
 See Jaap Hage’s paper. 
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framework, within which common methodologies could be worked out for quite diverging 
research purposes. Moreover, such methods should be so diverse that it would be extremely 
difficult to combine all the research skills needed, even in a coherent research team. In 
practice, the adequate research activities will rather be multi-layered, such as legal doctrine 
using elements of behavioural economics, which in turn, is using elements of evolutionary 
analysis in law (see the papers by De Coninck and by Du Laing). 
 
Four papers in this book have focused on comparative law (Samuel, Husa, Bell and Adams), 
but with a clear connection to legal doctrine. Indeed, Geoffrey Samuel argues that developing 
methods in comparative law could be a road to developing the methodology of domestic legal 
doctrine. Bart Du Laing for his part shows how the evolutionary analysis of law could be 
helpful in developing the methodology of comparative law: varying adaptation of cultures to 
local conditions as an element for developing a theory of ‘legal families’. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank Caroline Laske for checking the English language for part of the 
papers, and Antal Szerletics for his help in preparing the manuscript for publication. 
 
Mark Van Hoecke 
11 January 2010 
 
 
